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Abstract 
 
There is a large variation in the openness of political systems to the attempts of citizens to 
influence public policy. Open political systems are therefore often associated with higher 
levels of external political efficacy. We test this claim by investigating the relation between 
institutional structures and levels of external political efficacy, using the International Social 
Survey Program (2004). We find in contrast to expectations no relation between federalism 
and external efficacy. In line with the hypotheses a curvilinear relation between external 
efficacy and electoral proportionality was found: in both open and closed political systems 
high levels of external efficacy are documented. We show that some elements of institutional 
openness are related more strongly to external efficacy among citizens with higher levels of 
political sophistication and we argue that these citizens are better able to pick up the signals 
being sent out by the political system. 
 
Keywords: external efficacy, institutional structures, political sophistication, proportionality, 
International Social Survey Program 
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1. Introduction  
 
In a famous quote, Dahl (1971, p. 1) has argued that “the key characteristic of a democracy is 
the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens”. Empirical 
research, however, has shown important variations with regard to the degree of 
responsiveness: while some political systems can be considered as relatively open for the 
attempts of citizens to influence public policy, other systems are portrayed as much more 
closed (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995; Lijphart, 2012). Put differently, 
democracies are characterized by institutional structures that function either as incentives or 
as disincentives for citizens to become politically active (Tarrow, 1996). A general 
assumption in the literature is that as open political systems provide more opportunities to 
citizens to express their preferences, they should be associated with higher levels of political 
efficacy. On the other hand, closed political systems are expected to be associated with 
feelings of political powerlessness (Coleman & Davis, 1976; Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & 
Young, 2011). 
   The idea that the openness of institutional structures is associated with the feeling of 
political efficacy is voiced most strongly in the literature on voting behavior and in the 
literature on the political opportunity structure approach to the study of social movements. 
Despite this apparent consensus, at least three points remain open to debate. First, there are 
competing claims about what specific institutional structures are associated with political 
efficacy. Although federalism and proportionality are among the most frequently discussed 
institutional structures that affect the openness of a political system (e.g. Kriesi et al., 1995; 
Lijphart, 2012; Norris, 2008), different studies offer competing claims about the importance 
of these aspects (Blais, 2006; Hellwig, Mikulska, & Gezgor, 2010). Second, there is no 
consensus about the direction of each of these effects. In particular, with regard to electoral 
proportionality we find competing claims in the literature. For instance, Karp and Banducci 
(2008, p. 330) expect higher levels of political efficacy in proportional systems as 
proportionality reduces “the proportion of citizens who believe their vote makes little 
difference in elections”. Others, however, have argued that in majoritarian systems a vote can 
make more of a difference as these systems offer more accountability. It is argued that 
proportional systems typically are characterized by coalition governments which leave 
citizens with less political influence: “With key decisions one step removed from the 
electorate, voters will feel less efficacious” (Brockington, 2004, p. 470). It remains to be 
investigated therefore whether political systems that are characterized as ‘open’ in the 
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literature are indeed associated with higher levels of political efficacy. Third, it is debated 
whether all citizens pick up the signals that are being sent out by the political system. We 
argue that the relation between institutional structures and political efficacy is not the same 
across all groups in society, but that this relation is dependent on the level of political 
sophistication of citizens (Coleman & Davis, 1976; Hellwig et al., 2010).  
   In this paper we address these three research questions by means of a cross-national 
analysis of the relation between political efficacy and two types of institutional structures that 
are often claimed to affect institutional openness (i.e. federalism and proportionality). Using a 
multi-level analysis on 33 countries, we first investigate the direct relation between 
proportionality, federalism and the level of political efficacy of citizens. Second, we 
investigate the direction of these relations. Given that competing studies argue that more 
proportional as well as more disproportional electoral systems are associated with political 
efficacy, we propose a curvilinear model that brings together both claims. Third, we inquire 
whether the relation between institutional structures and political efficacy is stronger for 
politically more sophisticated citizens.  
 
2. The linkage between institutional structures and political efficacy 
 
Studying the linkage between the institutional structures of a political system and the feelings 
among its citizens that they can have an impact on the political process has a long tradition. 
Already half a century ago, Almond and Verba (1963) underlined the importance of studying 
the relation between the institutional structures and the political culture of a country. Their 
seminal study of five countries showed that citizens living in more inclusive political systems 
in general have  a stronger belief they can influence the course of governmental decisions 
(1963, p. 137). In this study we build on this school of thought that links the institutional 
structures of political system with the attitudes of its citizens. In particular we focus on 
political efficacy which has been defined as “the feeling that individual political action does 
have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, (…) the feeling that political and 
social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this 
change” (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). As political efficacy addresses both the 
sense that one can exert influence, as well as the belief that the political system is open and 
responsive to these attempts, a distinction was made between internal and external efficacy 
with internal efficacy referring to “beliefs about one's own competence to understand, and to 
participate effectively in, politics, and (2) external efficacy, referring to beliefs about the 
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responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands” (Niemi, 
Craig, & Mattei, 1991, pp. 1407–8). Consequently, we expect that institutional structures will 
be mainly related to external political efficacy. In effect, Coleman and Davis (1976) state 
that:  
 
“If external efficacy is an attitude (…) focused upon regime characteristics (…), then 
one must expect that the distribution of externally efficacious individuals will be in 
part a function of variation in regime performance. (…) unless citizen perceptions of 
government structures are totally random, there must be some degree of association 
between the reality of governmental performance and how citizens evaluate the 
responsiveness of their government.” (Coleman & Davis, 1976, p. 190) 
 
  There is less reason to assume that institutional structures are related to internal political 
efficacy, as this is more strongly dependent on individual characteristics of citizens. In the 
remainder of this paper, we will therefore focus exclusively on external political efficacy. 
The relation between political institutions and levels of external efficacy has been 
investigated mainly in the framework of electoral studies, and studies on social movement 
activism. 
Within the literature on voting, it is argued that institutional structures have an effect 
on external efficacy and levels of participation, since variations in the institutional structures 
influence the number of choices voters have in an election, as well as the impact of their vote. 
Thereby these structures are likely to affect the perceived efficacy of voting in a particular 
country. Moreover, by affecting the levels of external efficacy of its citizens, institutional 
structures can increase or decrease turnout (Brockington, 2004; Geys, 2006; Karp & 
Banducci, 2008). 
   Within the literature on social movements, studies on the political opportunity 
structure indicate that the beliefs citizens have about the effectiveness of social movements 
and consequently their propensity to participate in them, is influenced by institutional 
structures (Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1989). A political opportunity 
structure (hereafter POS) has been defined as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or 
permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success and failure” (Tarrow, 
1996, p. 85). However, it cannot be assumed that all citizens are equally knowledgeable about 
the opportunities that are available within the political system. The perception of openness 
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therefore can distort the effect of the POS on actual behaviour (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). 
Hence, the POS approach builds on the assumption that variations in institutional structures 
affect the level of external efficacy of citizens. Consequently, through affecting external 
efficacy, institutional structures are believed to affect the capacity of social movements to 
mobilize (Klandermans, 1997; Kriesi et al., 1995; Lee, 2010). 
While it is assumed that the institutional structure in a country is associated with the 
levels of external efficacy of its citizens, there is an ongoing debate about at least three 
aspects of this relationship: 1) exactly which institutional structures are associated with 
external efficacy, 2) what is the direction of that relation, and 3) is this relation the same for 
all groups of the population? 
 
2.1.  Which institutional structures? 
 
Several studies have tried to enumerate in a more precise manner what kind of institutions 
should be associated with external efficacy. Recurring elements in this line of the literature, 
are federalism and the proportionality of the political system (Lijphart, 2012; Norris, 2008). 
In a federal system, citizens typically have access to various autonomous levels of 
government, and it is expected that this should have a positive influence on their level of 
efficacy: if one level of government is not responsive to their demands, in principle they 
could direct their efforts toward another level. Federal systems in general are based on 
principles of power sharing, and this too should render them more open for the participation 
efforts of citizens (Lijphart, 2012). In a proportional system too external efficacy of citizens 
is expected to be higher than in a majoritarian system. Electoral proportionality is taken to 
allow for a more adequate representation of demands and preferences within the decision 
making process as more and more varied groups within the population will have an 
opportunity to elect their representatives (Farrell, 2001). However, these assumptions have 
been questioned. Karp and Banducci (2008), do not find a positive relation between the 
number of political parties in the executive and external efficacy. They argue that while these 
features might be associated with more access points for citizens, simultaneously they render 
the political system far less transparent, and therefore also less accountable. While citizens 
might have more opportunities to voice their preferences, in practice they do not know what 
the effect of this voice will be. Corcoran et al. (2011) too, find no relation between the 
number of parties in parliament and efficacy, suggesting that it is not always clear what effect 
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higher levels of proportionality will have on the policy that is actually being pursued. 
Nevertheless, in line with most of the literature our starting hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Federalism and proportionality are associated with external political 
efficacy of citizens. 
 
 
2.2. Positive or negative relations? 
 
In most of the older literature, it is assumed that a more open political system 
(operationalized as being federal, a more proportional system, with a larger number of 
political parties) can be associated with higher levels of external efficacy among the citizenry. 
As a federal system has more access points, the expectation is that citizens perceive it as 
more open resulting in a higher level of external efficacy (Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1996). 
However, federal systems are often rather complex systems with complicated divisions of 
competences among the regions. Hence, it might be difficult for citizens to operate in these 
complex systems resulting in lower levels of external efficacy among citizens in federal 
systems. However, in line with most of the literature we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between federalism and the level of 
external political efficacy of citizens. 
 
In addition, within the voting literature it is assumed that proportional systems are more 
responsive and therefore associated with higher levels of external efficacy. In proportional 
systems it is easier for a wide variety of parties to participate in the electoral process, 
facilitating the representation of a wider variety of political preferences than in 
disproportional systems where just a few large parties dominate the party system. As a result, 
more proportional systems have been found to be related to higher levels of political efficacy. 
Also within the social movement literature, the expectation is that “proportional 
representation allows for easier access than plurality or majority methods. (…) Where there 
are more political parties, social movements will be more likely to find allies within the party 
system” (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 29).  
  Yet, the assumption that proportionality is related to higher levels of external 
efficacy has not always been confirmed in empirical research. A more recent study from Karp 
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and Banducci (2008) shows that only the proportionality of electoral rules is positively 
related to external efficacy. The number of political parties in government coalitions, on the 
other hand, is negatively related to external efficacy. A possible explanation for this negative 
effect is coalitions are believed to be less accountable than one-party governments. 
Furthermore, Jackman (1987) has argued that “multipartyism assigns elections a less decisive 
role in government formation, depressing turnout” (Jackman, 1987, p. 405). Correspondingly, 
Brockington (2004) argues that while citizens in a system with proportional representation 
have a broader range of alternative parties to choose from, they have less impact on the 
composition of the executive. This lack of direct control over government formation is 
associated with lower levels of external efficacy. The lesson to be learned here is that the 
input and the output side of the political system should not be regarded in an isolated manner. 
Political systems with a more open input structure are associated with lower levels of system 
output as the openness allows only for very incremental policy changes. While citizens are 
better able to voice their preferences, the end result of the entire process might still be very 
limited (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 27). In closed political systems, with clear majorities, on the 
other hand, actual policy change is still believed to be possible, and therefore citizens can 
expect that their participation might have a real effect on government policy. Both open and 
closed political systems can therefore be associated with high levels of external efficacy, if 
we take into account not just the input side of the political system, but also the output side. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that there is a curvilinear relationship between electoral 
proportionality and external efficacy. In very proportional systems, the scope of the voter’s 
choice will give citizens the idea that their voice is heard in parliament. In disproportional 
systems, on the other hand, the higher odds that there will be a real output response might 
have an equally positive effect. It has to be noted, furthermore, that this kind of curvilinear 
relationship has also been found with regard to political trust (Marien, 2011). This would 
suggest some kind of trade-off between the openness of a political system, and its actual 
capacity to have an impact on society. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a curvilinear relation between the proportionality of a 
political system and the level of external political efficacy. 
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2.3. The same relation for all citizens? 
 
Not only is there much debate about the kind of relation there is between institutional 
structures and external efficacy, some studies indicate that the relation between institutional 
structures and the level of external efficacy is not equal throughout all parts of the population. 
Karp and Banducci (2008), e.g., find that citizens who prefer small parties are affected 
stronger by disproportionality. Hellwig et al. (2010, p. 721) emphasize that, “electoral rules 
may have some effect on perceptions, but only as filtered by individual political 
dispositions”. One aspect that assumably interacts with the effect of institutional structures is 
political sophistication (Hellwig et al., 2010, p. 706).  
Several authors have stressed the importance of political sophistication for the ability 
of citizens to make sense of the political system (Dalton, 2008; e.g. Dassonneville, 2012; 
Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Lachat, 2007). It can be assumed that citizens with high levels 
of political sophistication are more knowledgeable about the opportunities offered by the 
political system, and therefore they also should be more strongly affected by the political 
opportunity structure than those who are oblivious to those characteristics. In addition, 
several indicators of political sophistication, such as education level, political interest, and 
political media use have been found to be important predictors of external efficacy 
(Newhagen, 1994; Niemi et al., 1991; Putnam, 1993, p. 110). Therefore, we hypothesize that 
political sophistication is a moderator for the effect of the institutional structure on external 
efficacy. If a citizen lacks the ability, opportunity, and/or motivation to acquire knowledge 
about the political system, it is less likely that his or her level of external efficacy is 
influenced by characteristics of the political system. The fourth hypothesis therefore reads: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Political sophistication moderates the impact of institutional structure 
on external political efficacy. 
 
3. Data 
 
In order to study the relation between institutional structures and external efficacy, we use 
data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Citizenship (2004). This 
survey offers unique data for our investigation of cross-national differences in external 
efficacy. We include 33 countries from this survey in our analysis using macro-level data on 
these political systems. As a result, we can rely on data from 44,274 respondents. This 
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survey, however, has two limitations. First, data were gathered using different methods in 
different countries: Face-to-face-interview, postal survey and self-completion questionnaire. 
Second, the variable for political media use as a proxy for political sophistication was only 
included in 20 countries, leaving us with 28,365 respondents. The analysis on media use 
therefore will have to be restricted to this subsample. Despite these limitations, we know of 
no dataset that approaches the extent of questions about citizenship included in a comparable 
array of national contexts. 
 
3.1. External political efficacy 
 
To measure external political efficacy we use three items measuring the beliefs of 
respondents about government responsiveness. In the first two items respondents were asked 
to what extent they agree with the following statements (on a scale ranging from 1: strongly 
agree to 5: strongly disagree): “People like me don’t have any say about what the government 
does” and “I don’t think government cares much what people like me think” (for a 
comparable operationalization, see Blais & Rubenson, 2013). Finally, respondents were 
asked how likely they considered serious attention from government in the case they acted 
against a law they perceived as unjust or harmful. In Table 1, we show the factor loadings of 
each of these items, which allows us to assume we are dealing with one latent concept. With 
a Cronbach’s Alpha of .61, the reliability of this factor is relatively low, but still acceptable. 
The factor weights for these items will serve as our dependent variable. 
 
Table 1: External Political Efficacy Scale 
Variable External 
Efficacy 
People like me don’t have any say about what the government does (reversed) 0.78 
I don’t think government cares much what people like me think (reversed) 0.83 
In case of political action, serious attention government is likely 0.63 
Overall proportion explained variance 
Eigenvalue 
0.56 
1.69 
Note: Entries are the result of a principal component analysis on these three items. Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.61. 
Source: ISSP 2004 Citizenship. N = 33,622 
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3.2. Political sophistication 
 
Political sophistication consists of the opportunity, ability and motivation to acquire an 
understanding of politics (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990). This 
multidimensional structure implies that the concept of political sophistication cannot be 
summarized in just a single measurement. First of all, an individual must have the 
opportunity to gain access to political information (Dalton, 2008; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1996; Luskin, 1990). Koopmans and Olzak (2004) have stressed the importance of media for 
the diffusion of information about institutional structures throughout the population. In order 
to capture exposure to this diffusion, the use of political media is often put forward as an 
important indicator of political sophistication (Dalton, 2008; Guo & Moy, 1998).  
Second, political sophistication implies one has the cognitive ability to interpret and 
structure political information meaningfully (Luskin, 1990). As Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 
demonstrate, education is closely related to an “understanding of the principles of democratic 
government”, and to the development of political knowledge (1996, pp. 31–8). As a result, 
education is frequently used as one of the most important indicators of political sophistication 
(Dalton, 1984, 2008; Dassonneville, 2012; Lachat, 2007).  
Third, motivation is argued to be a third element of political sophistication (Dalton, 
1984; Luskin, 1990). Interest in politics will lead to information seeking behavior with regard 
to the way the political system operates (Prior, 2010). Political interest is therefore routinely 
included in measurements of political sophistication (Dalton, 1984, 2008; Dassonneville, 
2012; Lachat, 2007).  
In this analysis, political sophistication will thus be operationalized, using a 
combination of political media use, education and political interest. The ISSP dataset offers 
all three variables. Political media use was measured by asking respondents how often they 
read the political content of a newspaper on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1: “never” to 5: 
“every day”. The level of education was measured on a six-point scale, ranging from 0: “no 
formal qualification”, to 5: “university degree completed”. Finally, political interest was 
included with a single item “How interested would you say you personally are in politics?”. 
Answers were given on a four-point scale, ranging from 1: “not at all interested”, to 4: “very 
interested”.  
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3.3. Institutional structures 
 
The individual level data of ISSP were measured in 2004, and therefore we use information 
on country level characteristics of that year, or just prior to it. As the literature review has 
shown, federalism and proportionality of the electoral system are the two most relevant 
indicators in this regard. The indexes measuring these elements were selected on the basis of 
the Democracy Barometer project (Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller, Giebler, & Wessels, 2011) 
and obtained from the sources indicated below. 
To measure the degree of federalism, the work of Gerring and Thacker (2004) is one 
of the most used indicators. Since there is a relative consensus about this measure, we build 
on their work as well. For electoral proportionality a number of indicators can be used, and 
we include four of them. First, we use the least squares index from Gallagher (2012) 
(hereafter Gallagher Index), which indicates the proportionality of the translation of vote 
shares into seats in parliament. Second, the vote threshold for representation, referring to the 
percentage of the national vote a party needs to gain at least one seat in parliament, has often 
been used as an important indicator of proportionality as well (Lijphart, 2012; Selb, 2008). 
To include this variable in our model we use data from the World Bank’s Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001), completed by data from 
the Democracy Barometer for countries missing in the World Bank data (Bühlmann et al., 
2011).
1
 These data only refer to the legal threshold, as imposed by electoral law, and not to 
the effective, which is usually a function of district magnitude. Two different 
operationalisations of the number of parties are included in this study. The effective number 
of parties expresses the fractionalization of the parliamentary assembly (Gallagher, 2012). 
Finally, we include the absolute number of parties in parliament, as Karp and Banducci 
(2008) have argued that the absolute number of parties is more relevant for the attitudes and 
behavior of citizens, since this is more readily observable for citizens. An overview of the 
descriptive results of these variables per country can be found in appendix.  
  
3.4. Control Variables: Age, Gender and Corruption 
 
In most research age and gender have been found to be important determinants of political 
efficacy (Blais & Rubenson, 2013; Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 2001) and therefore these 
will be included as control variables at the individual level. 
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At the country level, corruption has been found to have an important impact on 
political attitudes like external efficacy, because “corruption violates fundamental tenets of 
democracy such as equality, fairness, and accountability” (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003, p. 
104). We therefore control for this variable in our models on the basis of the Corruption 
Perceptions Index by Transparency International (2004) (see appendix).  
 
4. Models and Results 
 
We start our analysis with an investigation of the direct relation between the institutional 
structures and external efficacy, testing Hypotheses 1 to 3. Since the respondents are nested 
within 33 countries we conduct a multi-level analysis. As the dependent variable is 
continuous we conduct a linear two-level model.  
Model 0 (Table 2) represents the intercept-only model in which the variance is split 
into two uncorrelated components: the variance between individuals within each country 
(individual-level variance,   
 ) and the variance between the 33 countries (country-level 
variance,    
 ). This model does not contain any independent variables and it can thus serve 
as a benchmark with which the following models can be compared. While most of the 
variance is situated at the level of the individual, we still observe a sizeable intra class 
correlation of 13 per cent at the country-level. 
In the next step we introduce the individual-level variables into the model.
2
 As Model 
I shows, the level of education and political interest are positively related to external efficacy. 
An additional analysis – but only on the 20 countries where data are available – shows that 
the third indicator of political sophistication, political media use, is also positively associated 
with external efficacy (see Appendix, Table A.5, Model I). Model I (Table 2), in which we 
also control for gender and age, explains roughly 9 per cent of the individual-level variance 
and about 4.6 per cent of the country-level variance.  
We introduce the grand-mean centered institutional structure variables one by one in 
the following models in order to avoid multicollineartiy and overspecification of the model. 
Moreover, we include in all of the following models the Corruption Perception Index as a 
country-level control variable. In Model II we introduce the degree of federalism, but 
contrary to Hypothesis 2, the results show that the degree of federalism is not significantly 
related to external efficacy. Moreover, the results of Models III and IV show that neither the 
effective nor the absolute number of parties is significantly related to external efficacy. In 
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Models V and VI it can be observed that also the proportionality of the translation of votes 
into seats nor the electoral treshold are significantly related to external efficacy. We clearly 
find no evidence supporting the first hypothesis when examining the linear relation between 
the institutional structures and external efficacy. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Country and Individual Level Effects on External Political Efficacy 
 External Political Efficacy 
 ,0 ,I ,II ,III ,IV ,V ,VI 
Intercept 0.,002 -0.,044 -0.,034 -0.,045 -0.,042 -0.,043 -0.,046 
 (0.,063) (0.,062) (0.,057) (0.,059) (0.,059) (0.,059) (0.,056) 
Individual-Level  
Variables 
Gender (Male = 1)  0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 
  (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) 
Age  -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** 
  (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) 
Level of Education  0.,113*** 0.,113*** 0.,113*** 0.,113*** 0.,113*** 0.,113*** 
  (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) 
Political Interest  0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 
  (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) 
Country-Level Variables 
Federalism   0.,062     
   (0.,037)     
Effective Number 
of Parties 
   -0.,030 
(0.,033) 
   
Number of Parties 
in Parliament 
    0.,013 
(0.,021) 
  
Gallagher Index 
(+) 
     -0.,010  
      (0.,013)  
Legal Threshold 
(+)
       0.,055 
       (0.,029) 
Perceived   0.,053 0.,042 0.,047 0.,046 0.,021 
Corruption Index   (0.,028) (0.,029) (0.,029) (0.,029) (0.,031) 
        
  
  0.,878 0.,797 0.,797 0.,797 0.,797 0.,797 0.,797 
   
  0.,131 0.,125 0.,106 0.,112 0.,114 0.,113 0.,103 
        
Deviance 91,204 87,943 87,937 87,939 87,940 87,940 87,937 
Note: Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel linear regression. All 
models include 33,622 individuals on the first level and 33 countries on the second level.  
(+)
 The Gallagher Index and the legal threshold are inverted so that higher values indicate more proportionality.  
Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001. 
 
 
However, in line with hypothesis 3, we expect a curvilinear relationship between 
proportionality and external efficacy.
3
 Therefore, in Table 3 we model the relationship 
between proportionality and external political efficacy in a curvilinear way by including also 
the squared terms of the four indicators of proportionality. As Table 3 shows, there is indeed 
a curvilinear relationship between between proportionality and external efficacy, when 
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proportionality is measured with the Gallagher Index (Model IX). External efficacy is thus 
high in both very proportional and very disproportional political systems. Model IX explains 
about 9 per cent of the individual-level variance and about 38 per cent of the country-level 
variance, and it is therefore the most powerful Model in this Table. 
 
 
Table 3: Curvilineair Relations between Proportionality and External Political Efficacy 
 External Political Efficacy 
 VII ,VIII ,IX ,X 
Intercept -0.,068 -0.,091 -0.,167** 0.163 
 (0.,080) (0.,077) (0.,061) (0.138) 
Individual-Level Variables 
Gender (Male = 1) 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 
 (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) 
Age -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** 
 (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) 
Level of Education 0.,113*** 0.,113*** 0.,113*** 0.,113*** 
 (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) 
Political Interest 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 
 (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) 
Country-Level Variables 
Effective Number of Parties -0.,041    
 (0.,041)    
Effective Number of Parties
2 
0.,007    
 (0.,016)    
Number of Parties in Parliament  0.,008   
  (0.,021)   
Number of Parties in Parliament
2 
 0.,006   
  (0.,006)   
Gallagher Index 
(+) 
  0.,067**  
   (0.,019)  
Gallagher Index 
2  (+) 
  0.,006***  
   (0.,002)  
Legal Threshold (+)    0.,045 
    (0.,028) 
Legal Threshold
2  (+)    -0.,041 
    (0.,025) 
     
Perceived Corruption Index 0.,044 0.,048 0.,006 0.,024 
 (0.,030) (0.,028) (0.,027) (0.,030) 
     
  
  0.,797 0.,797 0.,797 0.,797 
   
  0.,112 0.,111 0.,081 0.,096 
     
Deviance 87,939 87,939 87,929 87,934 
Note: Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel linear regression. All 
models include 33,622 individuals on the first level and 33 countries on the second level.  
(+)
 The Gallagher Index and the legal threshold are inverted so that higher values indicate more proportionality.  
Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001. 
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This curvilinear relationship is visualized in Figure 1 in which the predicted values for 
external efficacy resulting from Model VI are plotted against the Gallagher Index. 
 
 
Figure 1: Visualizing the Curvilinear Relation between the Gallagher Index and External 
Efficacy 
 
Note: Values are predicted based on Model IX (Table 3) on average by country. The Gallagher Index is inverted 
so that higher values indicate more proportionality and grand mean centered. N=33 countries. 
 
Looking at Figure 1, it becomes clear that the curvilinear relationship between the 
Gallagher Index and external efficacy is a result of the high predicted values for external 
efficacy in France and Great Britain. In the entire sample, these two countries clearly are 
extremely disproportional while at the same time their public opinion shows high levels of 
political efficacy. It is tempting to consider these two countries as mere outliers. However, 
we see two good reasons to keep them in the analysis. First, France and Great Britain 
typically can be seen as the idealtype representations of a majoritaritan closed political 
system (Lijphart, 2012). Removing those two cases would actually mean that the Lijphart 
thesis is no longer adequately tested, as we would only have data from more or less 
proportional political systems. That would imply that we could only test the Lijphart thesis in 
about half of the political spectrum. Second, it has to be noted that these are both very large 
democratic political systems, so for this pragmatic reason to, it might be difficult just to cast 
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them away as an outlier. Nevertheless, when we visualuze the effect of proportionality on just 
31 countries, without France and Great Britain, it becomes obvious that for the other 
countries, the relation is clearly lineair (Figure 2). We return to this finding in our concluding 
section. 
 
Figure 2: The effect of the Gallagher Index on External Efficacy (without Great Britain and 
France) 
 
Note: Values are predicted based on Model V (Table 2) on average by country. The Gallagher Index is inverted 
so that higher values indicate more proportionality and grand mean centered. N=31 countries. 
 
In Model X we conduct the same analysis for the electoral threshold, but here we do 
not find any indication for a curvilineair relation. Hypothesis 2 therefore receives only limited 
support. We find a curvilineair relation of the Gallagher Index on proportionality, but not for 
other possible indicators for openness. Furthermore it has to be acknowledged that this 
pattern of curvilinearity is purely driven by the cases of Great Britain and France, who have a 
very disproportional electoral system, compared to all other countries included in the sample. 
Without these two countries, there would not be any curvilineair relation at all. 
 
In our fourth hypothesis we assumed that political sophistication would serve as a 
moderator for the country level effects. A precondition to this assumption is that the 
relationship between political sophistication and external efficacy varies across the different 
political systems. In order to test this assumption we allow the slopes of the political 
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sophistication variables to vary across the different countries. We find that the slopes of the 
level of education, political interest and political media use are significantly random (see 
Appendix), and we can therefore proceed with our analysis.
4
 
In order to test the third hypothesis we introduce – again one by one – cross-level 
interaction terms which combine the three indicators of political sophistication with the 
indicators of the institutional structure. It becomes apparent that there are three significant 
positive cross-level interaction effects (Table 4, for the models with non-significant 
interactions, see Appendix). Model XI indicates the occurrence of an interaction effect 
between the electoral treshold in a country and the education level of the respondent. This 
model explains about 16 per cent of the variance of the slope of education. In Model XII we 
find a similar interaction effect between the electoral threshold and political interest. Model 
XII explains roughly 15 per cent of the variance of the slope of political interest. For political 
media use the interaction with the threshold is not significant. However, as displayed in 
Model XIII, we find a small significant effect of the interaction between political media use 
and the Gallagher Index, indicating that the positive effect of political media use is 
strengthened in proportional electoral systems. Model XIII explains about 36.6 percent of the 
random slope variance of political media use. 
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Table 4: The Moderating Effect of Political Sophistication on External Political Efficacy 
 External Political Efficacy 
 XI XII XIII 
Intercept -0.,055 (0.056) -0.,044 (0.057) -0.,193*** (0.053) 
    
Individual-Level Variables   
Gender (Male = 1) 0.,037*** (0.010) 0.,036*** (0.010) 0.,030* (0.012) 
Age -0.,004*** (0.000) -0.,004*** (0.000) -0.,004*** (0.000) 
Level of Education 0.,118*** (0.009) 0.,112*** (0.004) 0.,105*** (0.005) 
Political Interest 0.,228*** (0.006) 0.,230*** (0.015) 0.,176*** (0.008) 
Political Media Use     0.,050*** (0.007) 
       
Country-Level Variables   
Gallagher Index 
(+) 
    0.,067*** (0.016) 
Gallagher Index
2 (+) 
    0.,007*** (0.001) 
Legal Threshold
(+)
 0.,041 (0.028) 0.,057* (0.029)   
Perceived Corruption Index 0.,042 (0.029) 0.,011 (0.031) 0.,026 (0.023) 
       
Cross-Level Interactions       
Level of Education * Legal  0.,009* (0.004)     
Threshold 
(+)
       
Political Interest * Legal    0.,015* (0.007)   
Threshold 
(+)
       
Political Media Use * 
Gallagher Index 
(+) 
    0.,003* (0.001) 
       
  
  0.,792  0.,792  0.,799  
   
  0.,100  0.,106  0.,039  
                   
  0.,002      
                   
    0.,006    
                  
      0.,000  
       
Deviance 87,805 87,791 56,222 
N individuals 33,622 
33 
33,622 
33 
21,476 
N countries 20 
Note: Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel linear regression.  
(+)
 The Gallagher Index and the legal threshold are inverted so that higher values indicate more proportionality.  
Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001.  
 
 
However, based on the information in Table 4 we can only draw conclusions about 
the interaction effects when their constitutive terms are 0 (which is the average as these 
variables are grand mean centered) (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2005). Therefore we 
present three figures that illustrate the interaction effects graphically. Figure 3 clearly 
shows that the interaction effect is significant for all levels of legal threshold. The 
difference in external efficacy between citzens with high and low education is larger in 
countries with a lower threshold. We find a similar picture looking at the interaction 
between political interest and the legal threshold.  
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Figure 3: Interaction effect of electoral threshold and education level on external efficacy 
 
Note: Cross-level interaction effect between the level of education and the legal threshold. The graph is based 
on Model XI, holding other covariates constant. Simulations were used to obtain confidence intervals. Low level 
of education refers to lowest formal qualification, whereas high level of education refers to a completed 
university degree.  
 
For the level of external efficacy of respondents with little political interest it matters 
less in which type of system they are living. Again, this interaction is significant for all levels 
of legal threshold (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Interaction effect of political interest and the legal threshold on external efficacy 
 
Note: Cross-level interaction effect between the political interest and the legal threshold. The graph is based on 
Model XII, holding other covariates constant. Simulations were used to obtain confidence intervals.  
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In Figure 5 we do exactly the same for the interaction between political media use and 
electoral proportinality (based on only 20 countries). It appears that only in systems that have 
an inverted Gallagher Index which is larger than average (the average is indicated by 0), there 
is there a significant difference in the efficacy of people who read the newspaper on a daily 
basis compared to those who never read it. The external efficacy of respondents who read the 
newspaper on a daily basis differs only significantly from the external efficacy of respondents 
who never read the newspaper in systems that score roughly between -1 and 4 on the 
(inverted and grand mean centered) Gallagher Index scale. In very proportional systems such 
as Sweden and the Netherlands, there is no difference in the external efficacy of the two 
groups.  
 
Figure 5: Interaction effect of political media use and the Gallagher Index on external 
efficacy 
 
Note: Cross-level interaction effect between the newspaper reading and the legal threshold. The graph is based 
on Model XIII, holding other covariates constant. Simulations were used to obtain confidence intervals.  
 
To summarize, Hypothesis 1 can only be confirmed to some extent, as we find that 
only the proportionality of vote to seat calculation has a significant effect on external 
efficacy. We find no such effect for the legal threshold, the effective and absolute number of 
parties in parliament, and federalism. The second hypothesis, is also only partly confirmed: 
there is a curvilinear relationship between proportionality and external efficacy, but it is only 
true when proportionality is measured with the Gallagher Index. Finally, our findings confirm 
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that for a number of indicators, politically sophisticated individuals are indeed affected more 
strongly by variations in institutional structures, thus confirming Hypothesis 4.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The institutional structures of political systems affect the political attitudes of their citizens. 
However, it has remained less clear which structures are relevant in this regard; whether they 
render citizens efficacious or powerless; and whether this is true for all parts of the 
population. In this paper we have addressed these three problems.  
First, in this study only a direct relation between the proportionality of vote to seat 
calculation and external efficacy was found. No such relation was found for legal thresholds, 
the effective of absolute number of parties in parliament, nor federalism. As such, these 
findings qualify studies like Kriesi et al. (1995), that argue that each of these institutional 
structures should affect the beliefs of citizens about government responsiveness. The 
proportionality of the electoral system is indeed associated with external efficacy, but the 
same cannot be said for the other indicators that are being used in this kind of studies. 
Federalism is obviously not related to external efficacy, and it seems a straightforward 
assumption to relate this to the complexity and the lack of perceived accountability of this 
kind of political systems. 
   Second, the effect of electoral proportionality on external political efficacy was 
curvilineair. This finding supports Hypothesis 3 that both more proportional, as well as more 
disproportional systems are associated with higher levels of external efficacy. The current 
analysis does not offer us all that much information about how we can explain this relation, 
but the analysis makes clear that the British and the French political system are the main 
driving force for this curvilineair pattern. Despite the fact that both countries are highly 
disproportional, in practice they do allow for strong controls on accountability, and for an 
alternation in power. During the past decades both countries have repeatedly switched 
between left and right wing majorities. We could hypothesize therefore, that this implies that 
both conservatives and liberals do have the feeling that they can actually change government 
policy, if only their side would win the elections. Our analysis, therefore, to a large extent 
qualifies the rather negative outlook of authors like Lijphart and Kriesi on these systems, that 
are being portrayed as lacking democratic responsiveness. This might be true at any specific 
moment of time, as both in France as in Great Britain, opposition parties have very few 
opportunities to have an impact on government policy. If we take a longer observation, 
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period, however, Labour and the Conservatives in the UK, and the Socialists and the right 
wing parties in France have repeatedly switched government positions, which might be 
described as a form of longitudinal power sharing. The supporters of the opposition party 
therefore, do not necessarily have low levels of external efficacy, since they still have the 
memory that their party used to be in government, and they can have a reasonable hope that 
their party will gain power again in the foreseeable future. In closed political systems, 
opposition supporters, and citizes in general, are not as powerless as is sometimes assumed. 
We have to acknowledge, however, that this relation is only visible in extremely 
disproportional countries like the United Kingdom and France, and could not be found in 
other countries with moderate levels of (dis)proportionality. 
 
Third, we find some evidence for the hypothesis that the relation between the institutional 
structures and external efficacy is stronger among individuals with more political 
sophistication. We find that the relation between legal thresholds and external efficacy is 
stronger among individuals with more political sophistication as measured by education and 
political interest. The relation between electoral proportionality and external efficacy is 
slightly stronger among users of political media. Although the size of these moderating 
effects remained limited, apparently politically sophisticated citizens are indeed better able to 
pick the signals being sent out of the political systems. It would be tempting to speculate that 
those with higher levels of political sophistication are more knowledgeable about whether 
their political system actually imposes an electoral threshold or not, and how high this 
threshold is. The current data however, do not allows us to ascertain whether better 
knowledge is indeed the explanation for this interaction effect, and this would require a more 
reliable measurement of political knowledge. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables included in the Analysis 
 
Note: In total, the dataset contains 44,274 respondents when Italy, South Africa and South Korea  
are dropped. Source: ISSP 2004 Citizenship. 
  
Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable      
External Political Efficacy 38,660 0.000 1 -1.62 2.88 
      
Individual-Level Variables      
Gender (Male = 1) 44,241 0.466 0.499 0 1 
Age 43,941 46.866 17.331 15 98 
Level of Education 43,921 2.695 1.469 0 5 
Political Interest 43,532 2.414 0.877 1 4 
Political Media Use 28,365 2.854 1.430 1 5 
      
Country-Level Variables      
Federalism 33 2.436 1.592 1 5 
Effective Number of Parties 33 4.778 1.912 2.18 9.28 
Number of Parties in 
Parliament 
33 7.461 2.816 3 14 
Gallagher Index (inverted)
 
33 -5.658 4.421 -21.95 -1.05 
Legal Threshold (inverted) 33 -2.363 2.232 -5 0 
Perceived Corruption Index 33 6.784 2.079 2.8 9.7 
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Table A.2: Institutional structures per country. 
 Federalism Gallagher 
Index 
(inverted) 
Legal 
Threshold 
(inverted) 
Effective 
number 
of parties 
Absolute 
number 
of parties 
Perceived 
corruption 
Average 
external 
efficacy 
(factor 
scores) 
Australia 5 -8.6 0 3.17 5 8.8 -.11 
Austria* 2 -1.33 -4 3.02 4 8.4 -.29 
Belgium 2 -5.16 -5 8.84 10 7.5 -.40 
Brazil 5 -3.07 -5 9.28 11 3.9 .12 
Bulgaria 1 -7.82 -4 3.91 4 4.1 -.55 
Canada 3 -9.81 0 3.78 5 8.5 -.01 
Chile* 3 -5.08 -5 6.56 3 7.4 .41 
Cyprus* 1 -1.59 -2 3.76 8 5.4 .41 
Czech Republic 2 -5.73 -5 4.82 4 4.2 -.43 
Denmark 1 -1.58 0 4.69 8 9.5 .51 
Finland 1 -3.16 0 5.65 9 9.7 -.02 
France 2 -21.95 0 5.22 11 7.1 .57 
Germany* 5 -4.61 -5 4.09 6 8.2 -.33 
Great Britain* 2 -17.76 0 3.33 11 8.6 -.03 
Hungary 1 -8.2 -5 2.94 3 4.8 -.40 
Ireland* 1 -6.62 0 4.13 8 7.5 -.19 
Israel* 1 -2.53 -1.5 7.05 13 6.4 -.03 
Japan 2 -8.52 0 3.26 7 6.9 .19 
Latvia 1 -7.28 -5 6.78 6 4 -.46 
Mexico* 5 -4.74 -2 3.19 6 3.6 .74 
Netherlands 1 -1.05 -1 4.99 9 8.7 .24 
New Zealand 1 -2.37 -5 4.17 7 9.6 .13 
Norway* 2 -3.31 0 3.31 9 8.9 .26 
Poland* 2 -6.33 -5 4.5 7 3.5 -.24 
Portugal 1 -4.64 0 3.03 6 6.3 -.39 
Russia 5 -12.01 -5 6.61 11 2.8 -.36 
Slovakia 1 -6.97 -5 8.87 7 4 -.53 
Slovenia* 1 -4.79 0 6.02 8 6 -.48 
Spain 3 -4.25 -3 3 9 7.1 -.09 
Sweden 1 -1.52 -4 4.51 7 9.2 -.08 
Switzerland 5 -2.47 0 5.44 14 9.1 -.45 
United States* 5 -2.99 0 2.18 3 7.5 .47 
Uruguay 1 -1.32 0 2.49 4 6.2 .39 
Mean 2.27 -5.73 -2.32 4.75 7.36 6.77 .01 
Note: Countries with * are not part of the small sample measuring political media use. Countries that were left 
out are: the Philippines, Venezuela, Taiwan, South Africa, and South Korea. Data are from 2004 or in the case 
of the effective number of parties and absolute number of parties from the most recent elections in 2004. 
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Table A.3: Models containing cross-level interactions with the level of education 
 External Efficacy 
 I II III IV V 
Intercept -0.,054 -0.,053 -0.,052 -0.,175** -0.,043 
 (0.,060) (0.,058) (0.,058) (0.,058) (0.,056) 
      
Individual-Level Variables      
Gender (Male = 1) 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 0.,037*** 
 (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) 
Age -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** 
 (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) 
Level of Education 0.,119*** 0.,119*** 0.,119*** 0.,119*** 0.,118*** 
 (0.,010) (0.,009) (0.,010) (0.,009) (0.,010) 
Political Interest 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 0.,228*** 
 (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) (0.,006) 
      
Country-Level Variables      
Effective Number of Parties  -0.,020    
  (0.,032)    
Number of Parties in Parliament   0.,014 
(0.,020) 
  
Gallagher Index    0.,063**  
    (0.,018)  
Gallagher Index
2 
   0.,006***  
    (0.,002)  
Federalism     0.,059 
     (0.,036) 
Perceived Corruption Index  0.,062* 0.,064* 0.,026 0.,069** 
  (0.,028) (0.,027) (0.,025) (0.,026) 
      
Cross-Level Interactions      
Level of Education * Effective 
Number of Parties 
 -0.,008 
(0.,005) 
   
Level of Education * Number of 
Parties in Parliament 
  -0.,001 
(0.,003) 
  
Level of Education * Gallagher 
Index 
   0.,004 
(0.,002) 
 
Level of Education * Federalism     -0.,004 
(0.,006) 
      
  
  0.,792 0.,792 0.,792 0.,792 0.,792 
   
  0.,118 0.,108 0.,108 0.,077 0.,102 
                   
  0.,002 0.,002 0.,002 0.,002 0.,002 
      
Deviance 87,818 87,810 87,813 87,797 87,811 
Note: Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel linear regression. All 
models include 33,622 individuals on the first level and 33 countries on the second level.  
Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001.  
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Table A.4: Models containing cross-level interactions with political interest 
 External Efficacy 
 I II III IV V 
Intercept -0.,041 -0.,042 -0.,039 -0.,168** -0.,031 
 (0.,062) (0.,059) (0.,060) (0.,060) (0.,058) 
      
Individual-Level Variable      
Gender (Male = 1) 0.,036*** 0.,036*** 0.,036*** 0.,036*** 0.,036*** 
 (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) (0.,010) 
Age 0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** 
 (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) 
Level of Education 0.,112*** 0.,112*** 0.,112*** 0.,112*** 0.,112*** 
 (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) (0.,004) 
Political Interest 0.,231*** 0.,231*** 0.,231*** 0.,231*** 0.,229*** 
 (0.,016) (0.,016) (0.,016) (0.,016) (0.,016) 
      
Country-Level Variable      
Effective Number of Parties  -0.,034    
  (0.,033)    
Number of Parties in Parliament   0.,015   
   (0.,021)   
Gallagher Index    0.,070***  
    (0.,019)  
Gallagher Index
2 
   0.,006***  
    (0.,002)  
Federalism     0.,058 
     (0.,038) 
Perceived Corruption Index  0.,027 0.,028 -0.,011 0.,029 
  (0.,029) (0.,028) (0.,026) (0.,026) 
      
Cross-Level Interactions      
Political Interest * Effective 
Number of Parties 
 -0.,014 
(0.,008) 
   
Political Interest * Number of 
Parties in Parliament 
  -0.,000 
(0.,006) 
  
Political Interest * Gallagher 
Index 
   0.,005 
(0.,003) 
 
Political Interest * Federalism     -0.,017 
(0.,010) 
      
  
  0.,792 0.,792 0.,792 0.,792 0.,792 
   
  0.,126 0.,114 0.,116 0.,081 0.,110 
                   
  0.,007 0.,007 0.,007 0.,007 0.,007 
      
Deviance 87,799 87,795 87,798 87,783 87,791 
Note: Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel linear regression. All 
models include 33,622 individuals on the first level and 33 countries on the second level.  
Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001.  
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Table A.5: Models containing cross-level interactions with political media use 
  External Efficacy 
 0 I II III IV V VI 
Intercept -0.,021 -0.,049 -0.,049 -0.,053 -0.,045 -0.,044 -0.,058 
 (0.,080) (0.,077) (0.,077) (0.,065) (0.,062) (0.,065) (0.,060) 
        
Individual-Level Variables 
Gender (Male = 1)  0.,029* 0.,030* 0.,029* 0.,029* 0.,029* 0.,029* 
  (0.,012) (0.,012) (0.,012) (0.,012) (0.,012) (0.,012) 
Age  -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** -0.,004*** 
  (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) (0.,000) 
Level of Education  0.,106*** 0.,105*** 0.,105*** 0.,105*** 0.,105*** 0.,105*** 
  (0.,005) (0.,005) (0.,005) (0.,005) (0.,005) (0.,005) 
Political Interest  0.,176*** 0.,176*** 0.,175*** 0.,175*** 0.,175*** 0.,175*** 
  (0.,008) (0.,008) (0.,008) (0.,008) (0.,008) (0.,008) 
Political Media Use  0.,050*** 0.,050*** 0.,050*** 0.,049*** 0.,049*** 0.,050*** 
  (0.,005) (0.,008) (0.,007) (0.,008) (0.,007) (0.,007) 
Country-Level Variables 
Effective Number of 
Parties 
   -0.,015 
(0.,035) 
   
Number of Parties in  
Parliament 
    0.,038 
(0.,023) 
  
Federalism      0.,039  
      (0.,042)  
Legal Threshold       0.,059 
       (0.,032) 
Perceived Corruption 
Index 
   0.,073* 
(0.,031) 
0.,065* 
(0.,027) 
0.,078** 
(0.,028) 
0.,046 
(0.,033) 
        
Cross-Level Interactions 
Political Media Use * 
Effective Number of 
Parties 
   -0.,005 
(0.,003) 
   
Political Media Use * 
Number of Parties in 
Parliament 
    -0.,003 
(0.,003) 
  
Political Media Use *  
Federalism 
     -0.,007 
(0.,004) 
 
Political Media Use * 
Legal Threshold 
      0.,005 
(0.,003) 
        
  
  0.,874 0.,800 0.,799 0.,799 0.,799 0.,799 0.,799 
   
  0.,128 0.,116 0.,116 0.,083 0.,075 0.,080 0.,071 
                  
    0.,001 0.,001 0.,001 0.,000 0.,000 
        
Deviance 58,150 56,259 56,247 56,240 56,238 56,238 56,236 
Note: Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a multilevel linear regression. All 
models include 21,476 individuals on the first and 20 countries on the second level. 
Sign.: * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001.  
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Endnotes 
                                                          
 
1. We multiply the least squares index and the legal threshold by -1, so to establish that higher 
values indicate more proportionality and lower legal thresholds. 
2
. The individual-level variables are grand-mean centered except for gender. 
3
. Based on the literature we did not expect a curvilineair relation between federalism and 
external efficacy. However, if we included federalism-squared, the effect is 0.005 with a 
standard error of 0.037, which is not significant. 
4
. Again, this effect is tested based on a limited sample of 20 countries.  
